The 1905 Battle of Tsushima between the Russian Pacific Flotilla and the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the naval battle, the Russian squadron was defeated and destroyed. The bulk of Russian warships were torpedoed by Japanese sailors and sunk along with their crew members. Some ships announced their capitulation, only four ships returned to the shores of their native harbor. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) ended with a major military defeat of the Russian fleet off the coast of Tsushima Island (Japan). What are the reasons for the defeat and was a different outcome possible?

Military and political situation in Far East

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with a surprise attack by combat destroyers of the Japanese fleet on Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. As a result of the torpedo attack, two heavy artillery ships and one surface vessel were damaged. The history of the Far East includes many military actions. All of them were aimed at seizing and redistributing spheres of influence in this section of Russian land. Japan's desire to dominate Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula was fiercely supported by England and the United States of America. Russia's small allies, such as France, Germany and others, strongly supported the Russian Emperor Nicholas II in the matter of preserving Russian territories. However, at decisive strategic moments they still tried to adhere to neutrality. Allied cooperation was provided only when it suited their commercial interests.

Making a strategic decision

The ever-increasing Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, the main base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, forced Emperor Nicholas II to take decisive action. The decision was made in July 1904. A squadron under the leadership of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky was sent from Kronstadt to the weakened Pacific squadron to defeat and destroy the Japanese fleet.

Already on the way, the Baltic ships learn that Port Arthur has been taken and all the ships in the roadstead are sunk. The Pacific Flotilla has been destroyed. This is the maritime history of the Russian Far East. Nevertheless, Nicholas II decides to continue the path of the imperial fleet to the shores of Japan. To strengthen the attacking squadron, a detachment of warships under Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov was sent from the Baltic Sea.

Unequal forces of opponents

The course of the Tsushima battle could be predicted by the number of combat units on the opposing sides. The Pacific Flotilla of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky included:

8 squadron heavy artillery ships (battleships) against 4 Japanese;

3 coastal guard battleships against 6 enemy ships;

1 cruiser battleship against 8 units of the Imperial Japanese Navy;

8 cruisers against 16 Japanese cruisers;

5 against Japan's 24 auxiliary military vessels;

9 Russian against 63 Japanese destroyers.

The clear combat advantage of Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo speaks for itself. The combat experience of the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian fleet in all respects, despite the fact that Russia had a much richer history of naval battles. Japanese combat riflemen skillfully mastered the art of hitting enemy targets at long distances, and at one target from several ships. The Russian fleet did not have such experience. The main occupation of that period was the imperial reviews (parades) of naval equipment, which were held annually by order of Emperor Nicholas II.

Mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian admiral

The strategic objective of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky’s sea campaign was to capture the Sea of ​​Japan. This condition was set by Emperor Nicholas II. However, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky saw the following as his operational goal: to break through to Vladivostok by any force, regardless of the possible losses of his fleet. It's possible to get around Japanese islands from the east, it would be strategic the right decision, and Tsushima naval battle would not have happened.

But the naval commander chose a different, shorter route. The decision was made to go through the straits. The Korea Strait, connecting the East China and Sea of ​​Japan, goes around the island of Tsushima, which, in turn, has two routes: the western passage and the eastern (Tsushima Strait). It was there that Japanese Admiral Heitachiro Togo was waiting for the Russian sailors.

All passages are blocked

The commander of the Japanese fleet chose a strategically correct plan for possible military operations. A patrol chain of ships was organized between the islands, which could notify the commander of possible maneuvers and the approach of Russian ships. On the approaches to Vladivostok, the Japanese prudently placed minefields. Everything is ready for battle. The Japanese ships of the Tsushima battle were awaiting the approach of Russian ships. The commander of the Pacific Fleet refused naval reconnaissance, fearing that his squadron would be discovered by enemy reconnaissance cruisers.

The obvious outcome of the main battle of the Russo-Japanese War

To send such a motley armada across three oceans seemed crazy to many. Both veterans with worn-out mechanisms, who had logged hundreds of thousands of nautical miles, and the newest, hastily completed ships that had not passed tests, were sent on this doomed voyage. Sailors always treat their ships as inanimate sentient beings. The battleships with the names of famous commanders seemed to specifically not want to go to inevitable death. They got stuck on the descent during a slip, sank right next to the factory walls during repairs, and ran aground, as if they were giving clear warning signs to their crews.

How not to believe omens?

At the beginning of 1900, an assembly model of the battleship "Emperor" burned down in the workshop. Alexander III" The launch of this ship was marked by the fall of the flagpole with the imperial standard and was accompanied by casualties.

The battleship "Eagle" sank in a civil harbor, and later ran aground several times while catching up with the squadron in the Gulf of Finland. The battleship “Slava” was never able to be sent on a campaign.

However, the high command was unaware of any premonitions. On September 26, 1904, the highest imperial review took place in Reval (formerly Tallinn). Nicholas II walked around all the ships and wished the sailors to reach Port Arthur and join the first squadron of the Pacific Fleet for joint mastery of the Sea of ​​Japan. A week later, seven battleships, a cruiser, and destroyers left their native shores forever. The 220-day, 18,000 nautical mile voyage to the Japanese shores has begun.

Unforeseen circumstances

The main problem faced by the squadron command was the problem with fuel. According to international maritime law at that time warships the belligerent side could enter the ports of the neutral side only for a day. England, which owned most of the loading stations along the squadron's route, closed its ports to Russian warships.

The squadron's supply of coal, provisions and fresh water had to be organized directly at sea. For repairs, a special workshop “Kamchatka” was equipped, staffed by volunteer craftsmen. By the way, they also shared the fate of military sailors. Overall implementation strategic operation this scale deserves the highest praise.

The most difficult loading of coal on the high seas, unbearable tropical heat, when the temperature in the boiler rooms reached 70º Celsius, a severe storm at the Cape of Good Hope - all this did not stop the movement of the squadron. None of the ships turned back.

Circumnavigation across three oceans

The Russian squadron loomed like a ghost on the horizon, rarely approaching ports and harbors. The whole world watched her movements. International telegraph and telephone lines were overloaded. Correspondents and reporters guarded the squadron along the entire route:

Port Said (Egypt);

Djibouti (East Africa);

Aden (Yemen);

Dakar (Senegal);

Conakry (Guinea);

Cape Town (South Africa).

But all attempts were to no avail. The first long-term stop was in Masiba Bay (Madagascar). The cruiser detachment of Rear Admiral D. G. von Felkersam also joined there, taking a short route through the Suez Canal. During exercises in Madagascar, Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky became convinced of the inability of his subordinates to shoot accurately and maneuver correctly.

However, this did not surprise anyone. The crews were formed mostly of recruits and penal prisoners. Two months later - a jump through Indian Ocean. The endlessly tired squadron was met by Chinese fishermen in the straits near Singapore and the Vietnamese in Cam Ranh. The last sea caravan to be seen from Jeju Island were Korean pearl divers. The Battle of Tsushima would begin very soon; the date of the squadron's destruction was approaching.

First salvo against the enemy

At 13:40, the flagship battleship “Prince Suvorov”, under the leadership of Captain 1st Rank V.V. Ignatius, set course north-east 23. Nine minutes later, its guns opened fire on the Japanese squadron, and two minutes later flashes of response flashed volleys The Tsushima naval battle has begun. For most of the crew, the outcome was clear back in St. Petersburg.

From a letter from the commander of the battleship of the guards crew “Emperor Alexander III”, captain 3rd rank N. M. Bukhvustov: “You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory. At the same time, I guarantee that we will all die, but we will not give up.” The commander kept his word and died along with the entire crew of the battleship.

Battle of Tsushima, briefly about the main thing

At 14:15, exactly thirty-five minutes after the start of the battle, the battleship Oslyabya, led by Captain 1st Rank V.I. Behr, with a strong bow on the bow and a huge fire on the rostra, rolled out of formation and fell on the left side . Ten minutes later, he disappeared under water, leaving only wooden fragments and people floundering in the water on the surface.

A few minutes after the death of the Oslyabya, one after another, ships torpedoed by Japanese sailors broke down.

By 16 o'clock the battleship "Prince Suvorov" was out of action, which was severely mutilated by Japanese shells. Resembling a burning island, it repelled enemy attacks for about five hours. In the last minutes, the Russian sailors fired back from the only surviving three-inch gun and rifles. The battleship received seven torpedo hits and went under water.

A little earlier we managed to remove Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky with his headquarters to the destroyer “Buiny”. A total of 23 people were evacuated. No one else could be saved. The captain of the 1st rank, a talented marine painter Vasily Vasilyevich Ignatius, commanded a squadron battleship and died on it.

In general, during the Russo-Japanese War, two wonderful artists died, both of them graduates of the naval corps and, by a strange coincidence, complete namesakes. The second artist is Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin, who drowned along with the battleship Petropavlovsk off the coast of Port Arthur. Then, at the same time, Admiral S. O. Makarov, who won many Russian naval battles and was the glory and pride of the Russian fleet, also died. Following the flagship "Prince Suvorov", the Russian Imperial Navy lost:

“Sisoy the Great” under the command of captain 1st rank M.P. Ozerov;

the battleship "Navarin", led by captain 1st rank Baron B. A. Fitingof;

the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", which was subordinate to the later captured captain 1st rank A. A. Rodionov;

squadron battleship "Admiral Ushakov", whose commander was captain 1st rank V.N. Miklukhina (the ship was the last of the Russian squadron to die);

"Admiral Senyavin" led by Captain 1st Rank S.I. Grigoriev, who was captured by the Japanese.

The tragedy continues

The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 increasingly carried Russian sailors and their ships into the abyss of the sea. Another mortally mutilated battleship went under water with the entire crew on board. Until the last minute, people - from the commander to the fireman - had a glimmer of hope that they would be able to overcome this terrible battle of Tsushima (1905) and the Russian coast would appear on the north-east 23 course. The main thing is to survive. Many people died with this thought. Russian sailors on the following battleships followed with their gaze the place where their comrades died. They whispered with lips black from burning: “Rest their souls, Lord.”

The battleship Emperor Alexander III and its entire crew perished, and a little later the Borodino. Miraculously, only one sailor escaped. The outcome of the battle was predetermined. The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 made us think about the indestructibility of the Russian fleet. The next morning, the remnants of the Russian squadron that survived the night torpedo attacks were surrendered to the Japanese by Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. Subsequently, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov was sentenced to ten years imprisonment decision of the Naval Court of His Imperial Majesty.

The fate of the commander

The commander of the destroyer "Buiny", who saved Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, was captain 2nd rank Nikolai Nikolaevich Kolomiytsev. The fate of this man is very amazing. Before the Russo-Japanese War, he was a prominent hydrographer, traveler, explorer of Taimyr, and commander of the icebreaker Ermak. He participated in the Russian polar expedition of Baron Eduard Tol. Returning to Russia after Tsushima, where he distinguished himself as one of the best commanders of the Russian fleet, N. N. Kolomiytsev commanded various ships. First world war became vice admiral. In 1918, he was arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In most Soviet-era publications, biographical information about N.N. Kolomiytsev ends with the words: “He died in Petrograd, presumably in 1918.” In 1972, his name was assigned to a new hydrographic vessel. Only very recently it became clear that Nikolai Kolomiytsev fled to Finland in 1918. Later he fought in the Black Sea on the side of Baron Wrangel. Then he moved to France, and died in the United States of America under the wheels of a military truck at the end of 1944. Thus, the ship “Nikolai Kolomiytsev” was the only ship in the Soviet fleet bearing the name of the White Guard admiral and emigrant.

Historical background

From the lists of naval fleets of that time, two ships that took part in the Battle of Tsushima have survived to this day. These are the well-known cruiser Aurora and the Japanese battleship Mikasa, the flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo. The armored deck "Aurora" at Tsushima fired about two thousand shells at the enemy, receiving, in turn, twenty-one hits. The cruiser was seriously damaged, sixteen people from its crew, including the commander, captain 1st rank E.R. Egoriev, were killed, another 83 people were wounded. Unable to move forward, the Aurora, along with the cruisers Oleg and Zhemchug, disarmed in Manila (Philippines). According to some military experts, participation in Battle of Tsushima, gives more reason for the cruiser Aurora to serve as a memorial than the famous blank shot in October 1917.

In the city of Yokosuka, the battleship Mikasa stands as a museum ship. For a very long time, on the anniversaries of Tsushima, meetings of veterans and participants of the Russian-Japanese War were held there. The Japanese treat this historical monument with great reverence.

Memory of the lost sailors at Tsushima

Of the 36 units of the Russian squadron, three arrived in Vladivostok. The messenger ship "Almaz", the destroyers "Grozny" and "Bravey". Most of the ships and 5 thousand sailors found eternal peace at the bottom of the Korea Strait near the islands of Tsushima and Dazhelet. The graves of Russian sailors who died of wounds in captivity are still carefully preserved by the Japanese in Nagasaki. In 1910, in St. Petersburg, the snow-white Church of the Savior on Water, dedicated to the victims of Tsushima, was built with people's money and widows' contributions. The temple did not stand for long, until the mid-30s. The Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of Tsushima - these two terms will forever remain in the eternal memory of the Russian people.

Photos from open sources

On May 27-28, 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron was defeated by the Japanese fleet. "Tsushima" has become a byword for fiasco. We decided to understand why this tragedy happened.

1 Long hike

Initially, the task of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was to help the besieged Port Arthur. But after the fall of the fortress, Rozhestvensky’s squadron was entrusted with the very vague task of independently gaining supremacy at sea, which was difficult to achieve without good bases.

The only major port (Vladivostok) was located quite far from the theater of military operations and had an infrastructure too weak for a huge squadron. The campaign, as is known, took place in extremely difficult conditions and was a feat in itself, since it was possible to concentrate an armada of 38 different types of ships and auxiliary vessels in the Sea of ​​Japan without losses in the ship's personnel or serious accidents.

The squadron command and ship commanders had to solve a lot of problems, from the difficult loading of coal on the high seas to the organization of leisure for crews who quickly lost discipline during long, monotonous stops. All this, naturally, was done to the detriment of combat status, and the ongoing exercises good results They didn’t give and couldn’t give. And this is more the rule than the exception, since there are no examples in naval history when a squadron that made a long, difficult voyage away from its bases could achieve victory in a naval battle.

2 Artillery: pyroxylin against shimosa

Often in the literature dedicated to the Battle of Tsushima, the terrible high-explosive effect of Japanese shells, which exploded even upon impact with water, is emphasized, as opposed to Russian ammunition. In the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fired shells with a powerful high-explosive effect, causing great destruction. True, Japanese shells also had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

Thus, at Tsushima, the cruiser Nissin lost three of its four main caliber guns. Russian armor-piercing shells filled with wet pyroxylin had a less explosive effect, and often pierced light Japanese ships without exploding. Of the twenty-four 305 mm shells that hit the Japanese ships, eight did not explode. So, at the end of the day’s battle, Admiral Kammimura’s flagship, the cruiser Izumo, was lucky when a Russian shell from the Shisoi the Great hit the engine room, but, fortunately for the Japanese, did not explode.

The significant overload of Russian ships with large amounts of coal, water and various cargoes, when the main armor belt of most Russian battleships in the Battle of Tsushima was below the waterline. And high-explosive shells, which could not penetrate the armor belt, caused terrible damage in their scale, hitting the skin of the ships.

But one of the main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not even the quality of the shells, but the competent use of artillery by the Japanese, who concentrated fire on the best Russian ships. The unsuccessful start of the battle for the Russian squadron allowed the Japanese to very quickly disable the flagship "Prince Suvorov" and inflict fatal damage to the battleship "Oslyabya". The main result of the decisive day battle was the death of the core of the Russian squadron - the battleships Emperor Alexander III, Prince Suvorov and Borodino, as well as the high-speed Oslyabya. The fourth battleship of the Borodino class, Orel, received a large number of hits, but retained its combat effectiveness.

It should be taken into account that out of 360 hits from large shells, about 265 fell on the above-mentioned ships. The Russian squadron fired less concentratedly, and although the main target was the battleship Mikasa, due to the disadvantageous position, the Russian commanders were forced to transfer fire to other enemy ships.

3 Low speed

Advantage Japanese ships in speed became a significant factor that determined the death of the Russian squadron. The Russian squadron fought at a speed of 9 knots; Japanese fleet - 16. However, it should be noted that most Russian ships could develop a much greater speed.

Thus, the four newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type were not inferior to the enemy in speed, and the ships of the 2nd and 3rd combat detachments could give a speed of 12-13 knots and the enemy’s advantage in speed would not be so significant.

By tying himself to slow-moving transports, which were still impossible to protect from attacks by light enemy forces, Rozhdestvensky untied the enemy’s hands. Having an advantage in speed, the Japanese fleet fought in favorable conditions, covering the head of the Russian squadron. The day's battle was marked by a number of pauses, when the opponents lost sight of each other and the Russian ships had a chance of breaking through. But again, the low squadron speed led to the enemy overtaking the Russian squadron. In the battles of May 28, low speed tragically affected the fate of individual Russian ships and became one of the reasons for the death of the battleship Admiral Ushakov and the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Svetlana.

4 Management crisis

One of the reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle was the lack of initiative of the squadron command - both Rozhestvensky himself and the junior flagships. Any specific instructions it was not worked out before the battle. In case of failure of the flagship, the squadron had to be led by the next battleship in formation, keeping the given course. This automatically negated the role of Rear Admirals Enquist and Nebogatov. And who led the squadron in the daytime battle after the flagship failed?

The battleships "Alexander III" and "Borodino" perished with their entire crew and who actually led the ships, replacing retired ship commanders - officers, and maybe sailors - this will never be known. In reality, after the failure of the flagship and the injury of Rozhdestvensky himself, the squadron fought virtually without a commander.

Only in the evening did Nebogatov take command of the squadron - or rather, what he could gather around him. At the outset of the battle, Rozhdestvensky began an unsuccessful restructuring. Historians argue whether the Russian admiral could have seized the initiative, taking advantage of the fact that the core of the Japanese fleet had to fight for the first 15 minutes, essentially doubling the formation and passing the turning point. There are different hypotheses... but only one thing is known - neither at that moment nor later decisive action there was no response from Rozhestvensky.

5 Night combat, searchlights and torpedoes

On the evening of May 27, after the end of the day's battle, the Russian squadron was subjected to numerous attacks by Japanese destroyers and suffered serious losses. It is noteworthy that only those single Russian ships that turned on searchlights and tried to shoot back were torpedoed. Thus, almost the entire crew of the battleship Navarin perished, and the Sisoy the Great, Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh, which were hit by torpedoes, sank on the morning of May 28.

For comparison, during the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, the Russian squadron was also attacked by Japanese destroyers in the dark, but then, maintaining camouflage, successfully withdrew from the battle, and the night battle was marked by the useless consumption of coal and torpedoes, as well as the misadventures of the Japanese destroyers.

In the Battle of Tsushima, mine attacks, as during the Battle of the Yellow Sea, were poorly organized - as a result, many destroyers were damaged by Russian artillery fire or as a result of accidents. Destroyers No. 34 and No. 35 were sunk, and No. 69 sank after a collision with Akatsuki-2 (formerly Russian Resolute, illegally captured by the Japanese in neutral Chefu).

110 years ago, on May 27-28, 1905, the Tsushima naval battle took place. This naval battle was the last decisive battle of the Russo-Japanese War and one of the most tragic pages in the Russian military chronicle. The Russian 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, suffered a crushing defeat from the Imperial Japanese Navy under the command of Admiral Togo Heihachiro.

The Russian squadron was destroyed: 19 ships were sunk, 2 were blown up by their crew, 7 ships and vessels were captured, 6 ships and vessels were interned in neutral ports, only 3 ships and 1 transport broke through to their own. The Russian fleet lost its combat core - 12 armored ships designed for linear squadron combat (including 4 of the newest squadron battleships of the Borodino type). Of the more than 16 thousand crew of the squadron, more than 5 thousand people died or drowned, more than 7 thousand people were captured, more than 2 thousand were interned, 870 people returned to their own. At the same time, Japanese losses were minimal: 3 destroyers, more than 600 people were killed and wounded.

The Battle of Tsushima became the largest in the era of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet and finally broke the will to resist among the military-political leadership Russian Empire. Tsushima inflicted terrible damage on the Russian fleet, which had already lost the 1st Pacific Squadron in Port Arthur. Now the main forces of the Baltic Fleet have perished. Only with enormous efforts was the Russian Empire able to restore the combat capability of the fleet for the First World War. The Tsushima disaster caused enormous damage to the prestige of the Russian Empire. St. Petersburg succumbed to public and political pressure and made peace with Tokyo.

It is worth noting that in military-strategic terms, Tsushima meant little, despite the heavy losses of the fleet and the negative moral effect. Russia lost control over the situation at sea a long time ago, and the fall of Port Arthur with the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron put an end to this issue. The outcome of the war was decided on land and depended on the moral and volitional qualities of the military-political leadership and the resources of the countries. Japan was completely exhausted in military-material, economic-financial and demographic terms.

The patriotic upsurge in the Japanese Empire had already faded, suppressed by material difficulties and cruel losses. Even the Tsushima victory caused only a short burst of enthusiasm. Japan's human resources were depleted; old people and almost children were already among the prisoners. There was no money, the treasury was empty, despite the financial support of the United States and England. The Russian army, despite a streak of failures, mainly caused by unsatisfactory command, had only just reached full strength. A decisive victory on land could lead Japan to a military-political catastrophe. Russia had the opportunity to throw the Japanese out of the mainland and occupy Korea, return Port Arthur, and win the war. However, St. Petersburg broke down and, under pressure from the “world community,” agreed to a shameful peace. Russia was able to take revenge and regain its honor only under I.V. Stalin, in 1945.

Start of the hike

Underestimation of the enemy, mischievous moods, extreme self-confidence of the government, as well as sabotage by certain forces (like S. Witte, who convinced everyone that Japan could not start a war before 1905 due to lack of money), led to Russia at the beginning of the war not having in the Far East there are sufficient forces, as well as the necessary shipbuilding and repair capacities. At the very beginning of the war, it became obvious that the Port Arthur squadron needed to be strengthened. Admiral Makarov repeatedly pointed out the need to strengthen naval forces in the Far East, but nothing was done during his lifetime.

The death of the battleship Petropavlovsk, when almost the entire crew of the flagship died, along with squadron commander Makarov, had the most negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the Pacific squadron. An adequate replacement for Makarov was not found until the end of the war, which was another evidence of the general degradation of the Russian Empire and, in particular, the rottenness and weakness of the military leadership. After this, the new commander of the Pacific fleet, Nikolai Skrydlov, raised the question of sending significant reinforcements to the Far East. In April 1904, a fundamental decision was made to send reinforcements to the Far East. The 2nd Pacific Squadron was headed by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky. Rear Admiral Dmitry von Felkersam (he died a few days before the Battle of Tsushima) and Oscar Adolfovich Enquist were appointed junior flagships.

By original plan The 2nd Pacific Squadron was supposed to strengthen the 1st Pacific Squadron and create decisive naval superiority over the Japanese fleet in the Far East. This led to the release of Port Arthur from the sea and the disruption of sea communications of the Japanese army. In the future, this should have led to the defeat of the Japanese army on the mainland and the lifting of the siege of Port Arthur. With this balance of forces (battleships and cruisers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron plus squadron battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron), the Japanese fleet was doomed to defeat in an open battle.

The formation of the squadron proceeded slowly, but the events in the Yellow Sea on August 10, 1904, when the 1st Pacific Squadron under the command of Vitgeft (died in this battle) was unable to use the available opportunities to inflict serious damage on the Japanese fleet and break through part of the forces to Vladivostok, forced speed up the start of the trip. Although after the battle in the Yellow Sea, when the 1st Pacific Squadron practically ceased to exist as an organized fighting force (especially with regard to fighting spirit), abandoned the breakthrough to Vladivostok and began transferring people, guns and shells to the land front, the campaign of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron had already lost original meaning. By itself, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to independent actions. A healthier solution would have been to organize a cruiser war against Japan.

On August 23, a meeting of representatives of the naval command and some ministers was held in Peterhof, chaired by Emperor Nicholas II. Some participants warned against the hasty departure of the squadron, pointing to the poor preparation and weakness of the fleet, the difficulty and duration of the sea voyage, and the possibility of the fall of Port Arthur before the arrival of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. It was proposed to delay sending the squadron (in fact, it should have been sent before the start of the war). However, under pressure from the naval command, including Admiral Rozhdestvensky, the issue of dispatch was resolved positively.

The completion and repair of ships, supply problems, etc. delayed the departure of the fleet. Only on September 11, the squadron moved to Revel, stayed there for about a month and moved to Libau to replenish coal reserves and receive materials and cargo. On October 15, 1904, the 2nd squadron left Libau consisting of 7 battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 7 light cruisers, 2 auxiliary cruisers, 8 destroyers and a detachment of transports. Together with the detachment of Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov, which subsequently joined Rozhdestvensky’s forces, the composition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron reached 47 naval units (of which 38 were combat). The main combat force of the squadron consisted of four new squadron battleships of the Borodino type: Prince Suvorov, Alexander III, Borodino and Orel. More or less, they could be supported by the high-speed battleship Oslyabya, but it had weak armor. The skillful use of these battleships could lead to the defeat of the Japanese, but this chance was not used by the Russian command. It was planned to strengthen the cruising component of the squadron by purchasing 7 cruisers abroad in order to seriously enhance the power of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, but this was not possible.

In general, the squadron was very diverse in striking power, armor, speed, and maneuverability, which seriously worsened its combat capabilities and became a prerequisite for defeat. A similar negative picture was observed among personnel, both command and private. The personnel were recruited hastily and had poor combat training. As a result, the squadron was not a single combat organism and could not become one during a long campaign.

The hike itself was accompanied big problems. It was necessary to travel about 18 thousand miles, not including its own repair base and supply points. Therefore, issues of repairs, supplying ships with fuel, water, food, treatment of the crew, etc. had to be resolved ourselves. To avoid a possible attack by Japanese destroyers en route, Admiral Rozhdestvensky kept the squadron’s route secret, deciding to enter French ports without prior approval, relying on the military alliance of Russia and France. The supply of coal was transferred to a German trading company. She was supposed to deliver coal in the places indicated by the Russian naval command. Some foreign and Russian companies took over the supply of provisions. For repairs along the way, they took with them a special ship-workshop. This ship and a number of other transports with cargo for various purposes formed the floating base of the squadron.

An additional supply of ammunition needed for firing practice was loaded onto the Irtysh transport, but shortly before the start of the trip, an accident occurred on it, and the transport was delayed for repairs. The ammunition was removed and sent by railway to Vladivostok. The Irtysh, after repairs, caught up with the squadron, but without shells, delivering only coal. As a result, the already poorly trained crews were deprived of the opportunity to practice shooting while en route. To clarify the situation along the route, special agents were sent to all states near whose shores the Russian fleet passed, who were supposed to conduct observation and notify Admiral Rozhestvensky about everything.

The campaign of the Russian squadron was accompanied by rumors of an ambush by Japanese destroyers. As a result, the Gull incident occurred. Due to command errors in the formation of the squadron, when the squadron passed the Dogger Bank on the night of October 22, the battleships first attacked English fishing vessels, and then fired at their cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. The cruiser "Aurora" received several damages, two people were injured. On October 26, the squadron arrived in Vigo, Spain, where it stopped to investigate the incident. This led to a diplomatic conflict with England. Russia was forced to pay a large fine.

On November 1, Russian ships left Vigo and arrived in Tangier on November 3. Having loaded fuel, water and food, the fleet, according to the previously developed plan, split up. The main part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, including new battleships, went around Africa from the south. Two old battleships, light ships and transports under the command of Admiral Völkersam, which, due to their draft, could pass the Suez Canal, moved through the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

The main forces approached Madagascar on December 28-29. On January 6-7, 1905, Völkersam's detachment joined them. Both detachments united in Nosi-be Bay on the western coast of the island, where the French allowed parking. The march of the main forces around Africa was extremely difficult. British cruisers followed our ships to the Canary Islands. The situation was tense, the guns were loaded and the squadron was preparing to repel the attack.

There was not a single good stop along the way. Coal had to be loaded directly into the sea. In addition, the squadron commander, in order to reduce the number of stops, decided to make long marches. Therefore, the ships took on large quantities of additional coal. For example, the new battleships took 2 thousand tons of coal instead of 1 thousand, which was a problem given their low stability. In order to accept such a large amount of fuel, coal was placed in rooms that were not intended for this - batteries, living decks, cockpits, etc. This greatly complicated the life of the crew, who were already suffering from the tropical heat. The loading itself, in rough ocean conditions and intense heat, was complicated matter, took a lot of time from the crews (on average, battleships took 40-60 tons of coal per hour). People exhausted by hard work could not rest properly. In addition, all the premises were filled with coal, and it was impossible to engage in combat training.

Source of photos of the hike: http://tsushima.su

Change of task. Continuation of the hike

The Russian squadron remained in Madagascar until March 16. This was due to the fall of Port Arthur, which destroyed the original objectives of the squadron. The initial plan to unite the two squadrons in Port Arthur and seize the strategic initiative from the enemy was completely destroyed. The delay was also associated with complications in the supply of fuel and problems with the repair of ships in the roadstead.

Common sense demanded that the squadron be recalled. The news of the fall of Port Arthur inspired even Rozhdestvensky with doubts about the advisability of the campaign. True, Rozhdestvensky limited himself to only a resignation report and hints about the need to return the ships. After the end of the war, the admiral wrote: “If I had even a spark of civic courage, I would have to shout to the whole world: take care of these last resources of the fleet! Don't send them to extermination! But I didn’t have the spark I needed.”

However, negative news from the front, where after the battle of Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur, the battle of Mukden took place, which also ended with the withdrawal of the Russian army, forced the government to make a fatal mistake. The squadron was supposed to arrive in Vladivostok, and this was an extremely difficult task. At the same time, only Rozhdestvensky believed that success would be for the squadron to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. The government still believed that the arrival of the Russian fleet at the theater of military operations would change the entire strategic situation and make it possible to establish control over the Sea of ​​Japan.

Back in October 1904, the famous naval theorist Captain 2nd Rank Nikolai Klado, under the pseudonym Priboy, published a number of articles in the newspaper “Novoe Vremya” on the analysis of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. In them, the captain gave a detailed analysis of the performance characteristics of our and enemy ships, comparing the training of naval command and crews. The conclusion was hopeless: the Russian squadron had no chance in a collision with the Japanese fleet. The author sharply criticized the naval command and personally the Admiral General, Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who was the Chief of the Fleet and the Naval Department. Klado proposed to mobilize all the forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet. Thus, on the Black Sea there were four battleships of the “Ekaterina” type, the battleships “Twelve Apostles” and “Rostislav”, the relatively new pre-dreadnought “Three Saints”, and the “Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky” was almost completed. Only after such mobilization of all available forces could a reinforced fleet be sent to the Pacific Ocean. For these articles, Klado was stripped of all ranks and dismissed from service, but subsequent events confirmed that he was right. main idea- The 2nd Pacific Squadron could not successfully resist the enemy.

On December 11, 1904, a naval meeting was held under the chairmanship of Admiral General Alexei Alexandrovich. After some doubts, it was decided to send reinforcements to Rozhdestvensky’s squadron from the remaining ships of the Baltic Fleet. Rozhdestvensky initially accepted the idea negatively, believing that “rot in the Baltic Sea” would not strengthen, but weaken the squadron. He believed that it was better to reinforce the 2nd Pacific Squadron with Black Sea battleships. However, Rozhdestvensky was denied Black Sea ships, since it was necessary to bargain with Turkey in order for the battleships to pass through the straits. After it became known that Port Arthur had fallen and the 1st Pacific Squadron was lost, Rozhdestvensky even agreed to such a reinforcement.

Rozhdestvensky was ordered to wait for reinforcements in Madagascar. The first to arrive was the detachment of captain 1st rank Leonid Dobrotvorsky (two new cruisers “Oleg” and “Izumrud”, two destroyers), who was part of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, but fell behind due to ship repairs. In December 1904, they began to equip a detachment under the command of Nikolai Nebogatov (3rd Pacific Squadron). The detachment's combat composition included the battleship "Nicholas I" with short-range artillery, three coastal defense battleships - "Admiral General Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin" and "Admiral Ushakov" (the ships had good artillery, but had poor seaworthiness) and an old armored ship cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh". In addition, the guns of these battleships were severely worn out during personnel training. In the entire composition of the 3rd Pacific Squadron there was not a single modern ship, and its combat value was low. Nebogatov's ships left Libau on February 3, 1905, on February 19 - they passed Gibraltar, on March 12-13 - Suez. Another “catch-up detachment” was being prepared (the second echelon of Nebogatov’s squadron), but for various reasons it was not sent to the Pacific Ocean.

Rozhdestvensky did not want to wait for the arrival of Nebogatov’s detachment, looking at the old ships as an extra burden. Hoping that the Japanese would not have time to quickly repair the previously received damage and bring the fleet to full readiness, the Russian admiral wanted to break through to Vladivostok and decided not to wait for Nebogatov. Based on the base in Vladivostok, Rozhdestvensky hoped to develop operations against the enemy and compete for supremacy at sea.

However, problems with fuel supplies delayed the squadron for two months. All this time, the squadron’s combat effectiveness was declining. They shot little and only at stationary shields. The results were poor, which worsened crew morale. Joint maneuvering also showed that the squadron was not ready to carry out the assigned task. Forced inaction, nervousness of the command, unusual climate and heat, lack of ammunition for shooting, all this negatively affected the morale of the crew and reduced the combat effectiveness of the Russian fleet. Discipline, which was already low, fell (there was a significant percentage of “penalties” on the ships, who were gladly “exiled” on a long voyage), cases of disobedience and insults to command staff, and even gross violations of order on the part of the officers themselves, became more frequent.

Only on March 16 did the squadron begin to move again. Admiral Rozhestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Coal was received on the open sea. On April 8, the squadron passed Singapore and on April 14 stopped at Cam Ranh Bay. Here the ships had to carry out routine repairs, take on coal and other supplies. However, at the request of the French, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. On May 8, Nebogatov’s detachment arrived here. The situation was tense. The French demanded the speedy departure of the Russian ships. There was a fear that the Japanese would attack the Russian squadron.

Action plan

On May 14, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron continued its campaign. To break through to Vladivostok, Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Korean Strait. On the one hand, it was the shortest and most convenient route, the widest and deepest of all the straits connecting the Pacific Ocean with Vladivostok. On the other hand, the path of the Russian ships ran near the main bases of the Japanese fleet, which made a meeting with the enemy very likely. Rozhestvensky understood this, but thought that even at the cost of losing several ships, they would be able to break through. At the same time, giving the strategic initiative to the enemy, Rozhdestvensky did not accept a detailed battle plan and limited himself to a general approach to a breakthrough. This was partly due to the poor training of the squadron’s crew; during the long voyage, the 2nd Pacific Squadron could only learn to sail together in a wake column, but could not maneuver and perform complex formation changes.

Thus, the 2nd Pacific Squadron received instructions for a breakthrough to the north, to Vladivostok. The ships were supposed to fight off the enemy in order to break through to the north, and not hit him. The battleships of all detachments (1st, 2nd and 3rd armored detachments of Rozhdestvensky, Volkersam and Nebogatov) were supposed to act against the Japanese battleships, maneuvering to the north. Some cruisers and destroyers were given the task of protecting the battleships from attacks by Japanese destroyer forces and transporting command to serviceable ships in the event of the death of the flagships. The remaining cruisers and destroyers were supposed to protect auxiliary ships and transports and remove crews from dying battleships. Rozhestvensky also determined the order of command. In the event of the death of the flagship of the squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov", Captain 1st Rank N. M. Bukhvostov, commander of the "Alexander III", took command; in the event of failure of this ship - Captain 1st Rank P. I. Serebryannikov on battleship "Borodino", etc.

Commander of the Russian squadron Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky

To be continued…

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The Tsushima defeat is the worst in the history of the Russian Navy. The entire squadron was destroyed in less than 24 hours. Most of the ships were sunk, several ships capitulated to the enemy, and only 3 ships arrived in Vladivostok.

Japanese attacks on Port Arthur intensified every day. The 1st Pacific Squadron was very weak and could not hold back the onslaught for long. All this forced Nicholas II to send a second squadron to help them.

However, soon the emperor learns about the capture of the port, but does not recall the fleet back, but, on the contrary, orders them to maintain their previous course. A detachment of ships under the command of Rear Admiral Nebogatov set off for the meeting.

Enemy forces

The horrific disaster could have been prevented. After all, long before the start of the battle it was known about superior forces. The Japanese had:

• 6 guard battleships - against 3 Russians;
• 8 cruiser battleships - 1 Russian;
• 16 cruisers - versus 8;
• 24 military vessels - against 5;
• 63 destroyers - against 9 Russian ones.

Admiral H. Togo, who commanded the Japanese fleet, was a skilled commander. Japanese shooters could hit the ship even at long distances. Rich experience and numerical superiority played a big role.

2nd Squadron

Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, who took command, had one task - to capture the Sea of ​​Japan. Having chosen the short route to Vladivostok through the Tsushima Strait, he himself signed the verdict for the entire squadron. Another mistake of the commander was the refusal of reconnaissance, which could have warned about the Japanese fleet.

The fleet's problems began literally at the beginning of the voyage. England, where they expected to stop to refuel, closed the ports to them. However, even despite the storm that broke out at the Cape of Good Hope, the ships continued their journey.

The stop off Madagascar showed that most were incapable of military action, but Rozhdestvensky continued sailing through Singapore and Korea.

Predicted Tsushima defeat

Neither the emperor nor the commanders paid attention to the events preceding the departure of the ships. The battleships that were supposed to sail to Vladivostok behaved like animate objects. They sank, ran aground, got stuck, as if giving people signs that they should not go to the Far East.

The model of the battleship "Emperor Alexander III" burned down right in the workshop. When the battleship itself was launched, the flagpole fell into the water, and the launch itself caused the death of many people.

However, the commanders-in-chief seemed to have forgotten about the signs or simply did not want to see them.

Progress of the battles

Just half an hour after the start of the battle, the Japanese sank the battleship Oslyabya. Soon the ship "Prince Suvorov" was attacked. After a few hours, the only weapons left on him were rifles, which the Russian sailors used to shoot back to the end. After being hit by torpedoes, the battleship sank.

23 people were rescued from it, including the wounded Rozhdestvensky. After the sinking of the battleship Petropavlovsk, the wonderful artist Vasily Vereshchagin and Admiral Makarov died.

Following them, one after another, Russian ships went under water. Until the very end, the sailors hoped that they would be able to reach the shores of Vladivostok. But their fate was predetermined.

As night fell, Japanese destroyers went into action. A total of 75 torpedoes were fired during the night. On May 15, only a few Russian ships could offer resistance. On the morning of May 15, the surviving ships under the command of Nebogatov surrendered to the Japanese. The destroyer Buiny, on which the wounded Rozhdestvensky was located, also surrendered.

Only three ships reached Vladivostok: the cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny. A small detachment of cruisers was able to escape to neutral waters. The remaining ships sank along with several thousand sailors. In St. Petersburg, the Church of the Savior on Water was built in 1910, in memory of those killed in the Battle of Tsushima, but in the 30s. XX century it was destroyed

The shock of the Russian sailors who survived Tsushima is easy to understand. The shock of real events turned out to be too severe to free oneself from the hypnosis of the overwhelming superiority of Japanese weapons and try to understand the true reasons for the death of the squadron.

Indeed, Russian armor-piercing shells had serious drawbacks: a small amount of explosives, an extremely tight fuse (designed to operate only after the shell penetrates the armor), which is why they often did not explode when they hit an unarmored part of the side or superstructure. Of the twenty-four 305-mm shells that hit the Japanese armored ships, eight (33%) did not explode. This, without a doubt, had a negative impact on the effectiveness of their impact. But Russian shells in Tsushima pierced the armored casemates of the 152-mm guns on the Mikasa and Shikishima (six-inch Terni armor), and on the Azuma - the six-inch Krupp armor. The cruiser Asama suffered the most serious damage - the shell pierced the thick armor of the stern end and damaged the steering.

In Japanese 305-mm high-explosive shells with a very sensitive fuse, 8.5% of the mass was occupied by shimosa (lyddite, or melinite), which was superior in blasting effect to the smokeless gunpowder of its Russian counterparts. But the Japanese shells did not penetrate even thin armor and had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

"Eagle" received about 70 hits from shells with calibers ranging from 152 to 305 mm. The external picture of the destruction was impressive - numerous holes in the unarmored side, mangled superstructures, destroyed and burnt rostras and rowing ships. The ship was seriously damaged, losing 41 men killed and 87 wounded.

However, it retained its speed and a significant part of its combat capability, including three 305 mm, five 152 mm and ten 75 mm guns. None of the Japanese shells penetrated the armor. The effect of enemy hits affected the intensity of the battleship's fire, nevertheless, on May 14, it fired one hundred and eighty-five 305-mm and more than eight hundred 152-mm shells at the enemy.

Mikasa received about 40 hits and lost 113 people. On the ship, not counting the small ones, one 305 mm and two 152 mm guns were out of action. The battleship fired no faster than the Eagle; he expended 124 main caliber shells. Therefore, the quality of Japanese ammunition does not provide grounds for recognizing it as the main factor that decided the outcome of the battle. Nor was the imperfection of the Borodino-class ships, which showed good survivability in difficult conditions.

The main reason for the death of four Russian ships was not the miraculous nature of Japanese shells (by the way, after the war, the Japanese abandoned them), but the huge number of hits. The Borodino-class battleships kept their armored side intact until the very end, which provided the necessary buoyancy. However, numerous hits led to the formation of huge holes in the light, unarmored side, into which water poured in from the shells constantly exploding nearby. Continuous fires played a fatal role; While extinguishing them, huge amounts of water were rained down on the decks. Getting inside, it contributed to a decrease in stability and the appearance of a roll. In itself it was not dangerous, since with the well-established hold service it quickly straightened out. The situation changed when there was no time to straighten it and it reached 6-7 degrees. At the same time, holes in the light side and cannon ports entered the water, which caused loss of stability and capsizing. One of the factors contributing to this was the overload of the ships of the squadron, which led to the fact that the upper armor belt was immersed in the water at a roll of 6.5 degrees instead of 10.5 according to the design.

The Japanese command's reliance on high-explosive shells was not the most the best remedy to destroy armored ships. She demanded an indispensable condition - huge amount hits. During the battle in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese failed to do this with a single battleship of the Port Arthur squadron. Such super-density of hits on Russian ships could only be achieved by the consistent concentration of all ships of the Japanese battle line on one or two targets at the same time, which could be ensured by maneuver, which was the “line over the T.” The maneuver chosen by Togo allowed him to defeat the Russian armored squadron with artillery fire. In essence, for the Japanese admiral this was the only real opportunity to achieve a decisive victory; everything depended on whether he could outplay the Russian commander in tactics. Only one thing was required of Rozhdestvensky - to prevent the enemy from putting a “line” over his column. What actually happened is well known.

Thus, the Japanese were victorious due to superior tactics, particularly the tactical use of artillery. This allowed them to use weapons in an advantageous situation and, concentrating fire on the best Russian battleships, achieve large quantity hits. Their impact turned out to be sufficient to disable and destroy three battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabi type.

With good shooting accuracy (3.2% of hits from the number of large and medium caliber shells fired), the Japanese hit four Borodino-class ships, which received at least 265 shells out of about 360 that hit 12 Russian armored ships. Only 10 shells hit the battleships of Neboga-tov’s detachment, but they themselves were in unfavorable shooting conditions and, with a large consumption of ammunition, did not achieve noticeable success.

The quality of shooting of Russian battleships, naturally, reduced the enemy's fire impact. Therefore. at quite high precision in particular cases and with sufficient intensity, the overall firing efficiency of the armored detachments of the Russian squadron turned out to be three times lower than that of the enemy - only 1.2% of hits, which, with the exception of "Mikasa" and "Nishin", were fairly evenly distributed throughout the Japanese combat lines.

The Japanese maneuver was aimed at creating favorable conditions for artillery action and served as an effective means of evading Russian fire. On the contrary, the Russian ships were bound by a 9-knot squadron speed and direction of movement, which made it much easier for the Japanese to cover the head of the squadron.

In total, 22 Russian warships sank, 5045 Russian sailors were killed, drowned, or burned alive. Russia, having suffered a catastrophe unprecedented in the history of its fleet, found itself relegated to the category of minor naval powers.

The experience of the Russian-Japanese War was carefully studied by experts from all maritime powers. He had a great influence on the further development of fleets and naval art. Thus, theorists recognized the technique of enveloping the head as a classic and recommended it as universal.

Increased combat distances reduced the importance of medium-caliber guns; this required a revision of the artillery weapon system. There was a need to develop new methods of fire control that would ensure its effectiveness over long distances. The use of powerful high-explosive shells made it necessary to further increase the armored area of ​​the side, and the increase in the combat distance meant strengthening horizontal protection. The importance of survivability and stability of ships, as well as superiority in speed, was clearly revealed.

This clearly resulted in the need to create a new type of battleship instead of squadron battleships.