The banner “if there were no party, there would be no People’s Republic of China,” among many others, could be seen in the capital of the Celestial Empire during the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China.

He marked the beginning of a new stage in the country's development, which will take place under the banner of the so-called new era for China. And the new “guide” for leading the state will be Xi Jinping’s ideas on socialism with Chinese characteristics. Xi's ideas were included in the updated charter of the CPC. The adoption of amendments to the charter in itself is a planned event, but this time we can talk about its special significance.

The Chinese press calls the ideas of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and now the ideas of Xi Jinping the main achievements in the sinicization of Marxism. At the same time, he unambiguously explains that now the country, led by Chairman Xi, has a clear development path, and the party, guided by the ideas of the chairman, will finally be able to say goodbye to the remaining problems in the country. Observers, in turn, note that none of the previous Chinese leaders (except for the great Mao and Deng) managed to enshrine their name in the party charter.

Over the five years of his reign, Xi has shown himself to be a person with unconventional, flexible thinking, so you should not expect standard solutions from him

As a result of the congress, personnel rotations took place in all governing bodies of the party. At the same time, in their materials, the Chinese media draw attention to the fact that candidates for leadership positions have undergone thorough testing and selection, have high moral qualities and deserve the trust of the entire country.

On Wednesday, one might say, the main personnel intrigue of the 19th Congress was resolved, when journalists were introduced to the new composition of the highest echelon of the party - the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. Xi Jinping personally introduced those who will take the helm of China for the next five years. "I firmly believe that the life of the Chinese people will get better and better every year," Xi said at a meeting with the press. He advised journalists to closely monitor the changes that will occur in China after the 19th Congress.

Alexander Lomanov, chief researcher at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences:

The most impressive thing is that the CCP has announced development plans for 30 years ahead. This approach can be called unique; it characterizes the Chinese Communist Party as a structure that sets long-term strategic goals, the results of which most likely will not be seen by the majority of the current leadership of the CPC. At the same time, the set goals cover all main areas of development of the PRC, including economics, politics, strengthening Beijing’s influence abroad, social sphere, environmental protection and others. The package adds up to a comprehensive strategy that could transform China into a global leader and give it greater influence than the United States has today, at least in developing countries.

It should be noted that the current congress systematized the ideas and concepts that were proposed by Xi Jinping during the five years of his rule. One of these ideas is the construction of a common destiny for humanity. This is the key idea, although it, like all the others, is given in general strokes - at CPC congresses they generally do not present specific plans with numbers; ministries and departments deal with this only later. So, the idea of ​​building a common destiny for humanity is quite new for China. After all, Deng Xiaoping instructed the Chinese to act as quietly as possible, without demonstrating their capabilities. But now the situation is different, and Beijing has its own clear idea of ​​what the world should look like.

At the same time, Xi also proposed a change in approach to contacts with other countries, emphasizing that relations should be built on mutual benefit, and, moreover, China should remember its duty to humanity and be able, if necessary, to give up something for its own benefit in the name of helping people.

Also, one of the very important innovations of the 19th Congress of the CPC is the destruction of the informal system, when the ruling tandem rules the country for two terms of five years, and then the chairman of the PRC transfers power to a successor. But whether there is a successor is still completely unclear, although it was clear that Xi would take the place of head of state five years before his arrival. Two candidates who were considered as successors are no longer relevant today. One of them was involved in a corruption scandal, the other was simply stopped being mentioned by the Chinese media. I believe it is worth considering two options for Xi's actions regarding the transfer of power. Moreover, both options are equivalent. The first, a successor, will appear shortly before 2022, when the 20th Congress of the CPC will take place, at which Xi, according to tradition, can transfer power. The candidate, unknown today, will quickly be promoted to all the necessary posts so that he can take the chair of the first person.

The second option is that Xi himself can remain for a third term as Chairman of the People's Republic of China. To do this, of course, it will be necessary to make certain changes to the legislation. But, given that Xi is already an indisputable authority, canonized by the party as the author of the idea of ​​socialism with Chinese characteristics, amendments to laws should not be a problem.

At the same time, one should not expect that one of the six members of the Politburo appointed to the General Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee can become a successor - all of them are not qualified in age.

It should be noted that over the five years of his reign, Xi has shown himself to be a person with unconventional, flexible thinking, so you should not expect template decisions from him.

In conditions of an unprecedented information vacuum, the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China opens today in Beijing, at which the composition of the country's leadership for the next five years will be determined. The last year was marked by a behind-the-scenes struggle within the Chinese elite, whose factions sought to get as many of “their” people as possible into leadership positions in party and government bodies. General Secretary Xi Jinping has consolidated power to align himself with China's founding fathers and introduce much-needed reforms. The results of the congress will show whether he has accumulated enough political capital to finally defeat his opponents and break the unspoken rules by which the country has lived for the past 25 years.

Political process of the era of change

Usually the list of those who will be included in the Politburo that governs the country is known three to four months before the congress. This has been the case since the early 1990s, when investment poured into China and predictability began to be valued over secrecy. Foreign politicians and businessmen were convinced: regardless of who heads the state, factories will work, foreigners will be able to withdraw profits, and no political and social upheavals are expected. The certainty served as a signal that there are no two views on the development of society: there is a consensus in the Communist Party. Confucian harmony among the elite was ensured by the process of general accumulation of capital, against the background of which political squabbles seemed inappropriate.

This time the tradition was broken. Chinese, Russian and American experts, in conversations with Kommersant, only shrugged their shoulders: who, following the results of the 19th Congress, will take the helm of the state, one can only guess.

The increased level of secrecy may be evidence of the strengthening of internal party discipline that Xi Jinping has been working on over the past five years. However, it may also indicate that, compared to the times of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the number of people actually participating in decision-making has greatly decreased, and with them the number of “leaks” to the press. The current head of China has already seriously changed the face of the country's political system, and it is possible that in a week (when the congress ends), it will change even more.

Meeting every five years, the Congress of the Communist Party of China is the supreme governing body of the 89 million-strong party and, in fact, the entire country. Approximately 2,300 party delegates approve the composition of the Central Committee (Central Committee), which includes 200 members and 176 candidate members who do not have voting rights, but have a chance to later become full members. The Central Committee, in turn, approves the Politburo (25 people) and the Politburo Standing Committee (PCPB, seven people), which make the main political decisions. In fact, both the composition of the Central Committee and the composition of the future Politburo are determined by the previous composition of the Politburo in the course of intense bargaining between rival interest groups.

Since at least the early 1990s, the unspoken rule has been “sixty-seven - pass, sixty-eight - delete.” Members of the Politburo over 67 years of age must resign at the congress to make way for a new generation and prevent the system from falling into insanity. Age limits have also been established for other authorities. In accordance with them, following the results of the 19th Congress, the composition of the Central Committee should be renewed by more than half, the Politburo should leave 11 people, and the PCPB - five, all except Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang.

According to the tradition established by the architect of Chinese reforms Deng Xiaoping, the general secretary and prime minister take office at a congress whose year ends in two (1992, 2002, 2012, 2022), while congresses ending in seven (1997, 2007, 2017 , 2027), serve the purpose of summing up the interim results of the board. During them, as a rule, the future Secretary General and Prime Minister are introduced into the PCPB, who differ from the rest of its members in their youth (they are usually about 50 years old, while the rest of the PCPB members are 60–65 years old). In 2022, they were supposed to be protégés of former Secretary General Hu Jintao Sun Zhengcai and Hu Chunhua, the youngest members of the current Politburo.

Shaker of foundations

People began to talk about the fact that this entire orderly system would most likely collapse almost from the very beginning of Xi Jinping’s reign. The Secretary General immediately showed himself to be a much stronger and more authoritarian leader than his two predecessors. The anti-corruption campaign he launched turned into an unprecedented purge: the deputy heads of the Central Military Commission (MCC), which controls the army, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, a prominent party figure, Zhou Yongkang, and the head of the party committee of Chongqing (the largest city in the PRC by area) were sent to prison on charges of corruption. ) Bo Xilai, previously considered untouchable. But the real shock was the removal from his post in July and subsequent arrest of the new head of the Chongqing Party Committee, Sun Zhengcai, who was considered one of two future leaders of the country agreed upon by the elite.

Then there were rumors that Xi Jinping might ignore age restrictions and retain in his post his closest ally, the head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDCI, the main anti-corruption body) Wang Qishan, who turned 69 in 2017. He has fought tirelessly for the past five years with the political enemies of the Secretary General, and finding a replacement for him would not be easy. Over the past year, senior party officials in the official Chinese media have been preparing the ground for retaining Wang Qishan in his post, casually dropping phrases that “age restrictions are a custom, not a rule” and “with the development of modern medicine, it is a person’s skills that matter, not his age."

Against the backdrop of obvious disagreements between top officials in the ruling tandem, many experts began to say that a “vote of no confidence” in Prime Minister Li Keqiang could well be passed at the congress. He belongs to the “Komsomol” group opposing Xi Jinping, whose head is considered former secretary general Hu Jintao. Differences in views between the two leaders due to the closed nature of the system are not always obvious, but in general the Secretary General is a supporter of much more radical changes in the economy. Xi Jinping’s economic adviser Liu He, who signed his articles as an “authoritative person,” criticized Li Keqiang’s actions in 2015 and 2016 in the official media. He pointed out the indecisive and erroneous nature of the prime minister’s actions in the situation with the reform of state-owned enterprises and the financial crisis of 2015.

Finally, the main long-term intrigue of the congress will be the issue of preserving the powers of Xi Jinping himself beyond the established ten-year period. “He will not leave in 2022,” Akio Takahara, a professor at the University of Tokyo, assured Kommersant. “Given the scale of the reforms he started and the desire to remain in history, he will look for ways to stay in power and bring what he started to the end.” Technically, the intention to violate the ten-year limit will be indicated by the absence of two young successor politicians in the new composition of the PCPB. However, there are possible options here. “For example, Xi Jinping can retain real power in 2022, remaining the head of the party and the Central Military Commission, and give his post of chairman of the People’s Republic of China to someone else,” Ivan Zuenko, a researcher at the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told Kommersant. Until 1992, these positions were divided and the post of Chairman of the People's Republic of China was not so important.”

New Zhejiang Army

At the congress, the Secretary General, like any leader before him, will try to get as many of his people as possible into the governing bodies. “He needs not just personnel in high positions, but those who really influence political decision-making. At the same time, formally they may even occupy less prominent positions,” says Alexander Gabuev, head of the Asia program of the Carnegie Moscow Center. “In particular, he will most likely try to staff the management of departments of the CPC Central Committee and appoint heads of all the most important small groups.” , where the real development of the course takes place.”

Xi Jinping's protégés are called the "new Zhejiang army" in China, as most of his proteges encountered him in one way or another during his work in Zhejiang province. Among them, the most interesting figure is the current head of the Chongqing Party Committee, Chen Min'er. He served as head of Zhejiang's propaganda department during the period when the province was led by Xi Jinping. Chen Ming'er's age is quite suitable for the role of one of the two leaders of the next generation of leaders. This is already his second appointment to the role of head of the regional party committee: before Chongqing, he led the province of Guizhou and thus fulfilled one of the unspoken conditions for joining the PCPB: to work as the head of at least one rich and one poor region.

Other supporters of Xi Jinping who may join the PCPB and the Politburo include the head of the organizational department of the CPC Central Committee Zhao Leji, the heads of the party committees of Shanghai and Beijing Han Zheng and Cai Qi, the head of the office of the CPC Central Committee Li Zhanshu, his economic adviser Liu He and a number of other people. The Secretary General has enough people to fill all the vacant posts in the highest party government, but he may not have enough political capital. Because of this, as many experts interviewed by Kommersant noted, he may agree to reduce the standing committee of the Politburo from seven to five people, which internal party rules fully allow. This will make it easier for Xi Jinping to implement his decisions, but could cause discontent within a party that has become accustomed to more democratic decision-making over the past 30 years.

The most consensus configuration of the elite today seems to be the introduction into the PCPB of both the protégé of Secretary General Chen Ming’er and the Party Secretary of Guangdong Province, Hu Chunhua, who belongs to the “Komsomol” faction opposing Xi Jinping. This would make it possible to maintain intra-elite harmony and ensure continuity of power in 2022.

An idea thrown to the masses

At the congress, the Secretary General will present a report that will summarize the results of the past five years and set guidelines for the next five. It usually consists of approximately 29 thousand hieroglyphs and 13 sections. Briefly the most important points The report was outlined in a communiqué issued on October 14 at the end of the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 18th convocation. According to it, changes will be made to the charter of the Communist Party, which in fact stands above the constitution of the PRC. These changes “will reflect the latest achievements of the sinicization of Marxism, new concepts of management, new experience in strengthening the leadership of the party."

In other words, the contribution of Xi Jinping himself will be added to the party charter, who, unlike his predecessors, has already given birth to several concepts that claim a place in history. The intrigue here is whether the Secretary General’s ideas will be listed in the charter impersonally, such as Hu Jintao’s “concept of scientific development,” or with a name mentioned, like the “Mao Zedong Thought” and “Deng Xiaoping Theory” already included in the text. If they choose the second option, this will mean that the current leader of China will stand on a par with the founding fathers of the country and is much higher than his two predecessors.

The Chinese press began to prepare the ground ahead of time for the inclusion of “Xi Jinping Thoughts” in the charter. In July, the influential communist publication Party Building Studies published an article about them, according to which the secretary general’s concept helps “to further localize Marxism in China and develop the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” As a senior researcher at the Center for Research noted in an interview with Kommersant East Asia and SCO IMI MGIMO Igor Denisov, “most likely, the ideas of the Secretary General will be included in the text of the charter as a new concept of public administration.”

However, if the charter is replenished with “Xi Jinping Thoughts,” this will most likely indicate an authoritarian character new government, and not about the fact that the current Secretary General in terms of personality has become on a par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Although the Xinhua news agency spent the entire pre-congress week recalling the successes achieved over the past five years (average annual economic growth of 7.2%, an increase in household disposable income from 7.3 thousand yuan to 23.8 thousand yuan, a two-fold reduction in poverty), the majority of which were the result of the economic machine built by Xi Jinping's predecessors. Over the past five years, he has basically consolidated power in order to break the inert bureaucratic environment. The era opened by the 19th Congress will show whether he uses his powers to transform society or whether strengthening power was an end in itself.

Mikhail Korostikov

On the eve of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China, experts unanimously predicted a further strengthening of the apparatus positions of the leader of the Chinese Communists and Chairman of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping. The reality exceeded all our wildest expectations. For the first time since the death of the “great helmsman” Mao Zedong and his successor-reformer Deng Xiaoping, China has named a leader whose ideological guidelines become a guideline for the party and the nation. This is Comrade Xi Jinping.

Xi Jinping's ideas have become the party's "wealth"

His report to the Party Congress with its title alone set the tone for all the subsequent transformations - “Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on Chinese-Style Socialism in a New Era.” Now the thoughts of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPC (about the development of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong, the theory of Deng Xiaoping, about the economy, society, army, etc.) organically entered into the decisions of the congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

They are even reflected in the charter of the Chinese communists. The amendment to the text of the charter adopted at the congress confirms “the richness of Xi Jinping’s ideas in the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” and makes them a beacon for the entire party. It should be noted that during his lifetime, only the name of the founder of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong, was included in the CPC charter. Deng Xiaoping received this honor only after his death. So Comrade Xi is really second only to Chairman Mao.

Why did Xi Jinping so captivate the Chinese communists during his five years at the head of the country and the Communist Party? Part of the answer lies in his 3.5 hour speech at the convention. In it, Xi Jinping called for completing the “new journey to build socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In practical terms, this means achieving a middle-income society and transforming China into a rich, powerful, democratic and modernized socialist state by 2050.

Propagandists of the Communist Party have already peeled off the metaphors of their leader that were unnecessary for the world and formulated the goals of Comrade Xi briefly and simply: Deng Xiaoping sought to make China rich, Xi Jinping strong. The Chinese were convinced that Comrade Xi could achieve the stated result during his five years of work in senior positions in the state and party.

It is worth noting here that after the long and highly controversial reign of Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communists developed a form of collective party management. Now, under the authoritative and recognized leader of the Communist Party, a very influential standing committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee functions. In addition, the Secretary General of the party can be in power for no more than two terms - 10 years.

It so happened that Xi Jinping headed the Communist Party of China with two of his predecessors still alive - Jian Zemin and Hu Jintao. Formally, the former leaders of China have retired. But their comrades remained in the party, government structures and army, who continued the political line of Jiang and Hu, making it difficult for the new Chinese leader to make independent decisions.

Xi Jinping, apparently, was not happy with this situation. The first thing he did was reduce the composition of the standing committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee from nine to seven members. This reduced the ability of clans representing the interests of former leaders to influence political decision-making.

The West is afraid of “one-party dictatorship”

The second step of President Xi was his widespread fight against corruption. She not only revitalized the party and state apparatus of China, but also broke financial relationships within the clans. In the first year of the campaign, more than 160,000 Chinese officials and party leaders were arrested on corruption charges.

In five years, experts believe, the number of corrupt officials brought to justice has reached a million people. Many ministers, governors, leaders of regional party organizations, etc. went to trial. It was a painful process. The BBC cites in this regard a statement by the head of the Chinese State Securities Control Committee, Liu Shiyu, which he made at a special meeting of the Committee dedicated to preparations for the congress.

Liu said six former senior officials were planning to oust Communist Party leader Xi Jinping. He named former Chinese Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2015. Two years earlier, the former head of the party organization of the industrial center of Chongqing, Bo Xilai, received the same punishment.

This July he was arrested for the same reason former member Politburo of the CPC Central Committee by Sun Zhengcai. He has been stripped of all party posts. In addition to them, Liu named high-ranking military personnel and summed up: “Xi Jinping has dealt with these problems and eliminated the most dangerous secret threat to the party and the country.”

With this statement, Liu Shiyu actually confirmed that there is a permanent struggle for influence within the Communist Party of China and, judging by the results of the CPC Congress that ended, Xi Jinping is conducting it very successfully. The point here is not only about the rise of Comrade Xi over the party through the fixation of his political ideas in the charter of the CPC.

Experts attach no less importance to the formation of new elected bodies of the party. Thus, out of the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Xi Jinping replaced five. The formal basis for this was the age of the dismissed leaders. They are over 68 years old. According to an unwritten rule in the CPC, in this case, veterans must give way to younger nominees.

In fact, the rotation practically knocked out Jiang Zemin’s henchmen from the highest governing body of the Communist Party of China. Now the leadership of the PRC consists entirely of people who were included in the Politburo and the Central Committee already under Xi Jinping - in 2012 and later. Some of them belong to Hu Jintao's clan, which is loyal to Xi. The rest are obvious creatures of the Secretary General himself.

Now Xi Jinping is calmly and confidently forming his own clan. Experts even have the impression that the Chinese leader sees his political future beyond the second election term. This is supported by the fact that the “richness of Xi Jinping’s ideas” and plans to make China a “powerful state” became the official doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party after the last congress. This is not inherited.

But something else is no less important. “Not a single party leader since Mao Zedong has concentrated as much power in his hands as one coming from old family Xi Jinping’s functionaries in the first five years of his rule,” notes Deutsche Welle columnist Matthias von Hein.

It should be added that after the last Party Congress, the concentration of power among Comrade Xi has increased even more. Indeed, in addition to reshuffles in the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, its Central Committee has been updated by 70 percent. This has not happened in the Chinese Party since 1969. Direct analogies suggest themselves.

The CPC Central Committee now not only shares the program goals of its leader, but also the public sentiments of the nation. Recent Poll public opinion showed that 70 percent of Chinese have a positive assessment of the work of Mao Zedong. Experts believe: these survey data indicate the nation’s readiness for the “one-party dictatorship” of Chairman Xi.

Xi Jinping is also ready for it. At least at the congress, he announced his intention to introduce a “social quality control system” for each of China's 730 million Internet users. Any action they take will be rewarded with special points or, conversely, punished by their removal. There are similar plans for other social projects.

The West is concerned. The economic and political will of China, gathered into a single fist after the CPC Congress, will allow Chairman Xi not only to successfully compete with the Western model of social and economic development, but also significantly exceed it. Perhaps these expert forecasts will soon become a reality...

Carnegie experts answer questions about how the 19th CPC Congress, which began in Beijing, and subsequent political appointments may affect China's politics and its role on the world stage

On October 18, the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China began, at the end of which it will be determined who will join the new generation of leaders of the country. This rotation occurs in China every five years, but is especially important now given China's growing economic ambitions and increasing importance on the world stage. In addition, US President Donald Trump is expected to make his first visit to Asia soon, amid the worsening situation around North Korea. The international community is waiting to see what course China will take under Xi Jinping, and the appointments will show how much Xi has consolidated power and how popular his political agenda is.

Carnegie experts answer questions about how the results of the congress may affect China's policies and its role on the world stage.

What will be the consequences of the congress for Beijing's policy towards North Korea?

Paul Henle, director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for the Study of World Politics

The Chinese leadership still does not believe that the DPRK is its problem, and the 19th Congress will not change anything in this regard. Of course, Beijing opposes Pyongyang's provocations and hopes that Kim Jong-un will stop the nuclear program. But as long as North Korea's actions do not threaten the CCP's legitimacy in the eyes of Chinese citizens, it is extremely unlikely that Beijing's approach to the North Korean issue will fundamentally change. Young Chinese increasingly view the DPRK as a liability, and Pyongyang has continually damaged Xi's reputation internationally. However, neither one nor the other solves anything for Beijing.

A more serious concern is that North Korean nuclear tests could release radioactive material into Chinese territory. It is also dangerous for China that the DPRK could realize its main threat - detonating a missile with a nuclear warhead over the Pacific Ocean. This could lead to instability of the CCP's political regime and negatively affect China's national interests. This is the only thing that can completely piss off the Chinese leadership. Therefore, whether the DPRK will become a problem for China depends not on the results of the congress or Trump’s tweets, but on the actions of Kim Jong-un himself.

Will economic reforms accelerate after the congress?

Yukon Huang, Senior Fellow, Asia Studies Program, Carnegie Endowment

Some experts expect reforms to accelerate once the management team is revamped. But this depends on whether the new leadership will be able to resolve the main contradiction in the decisions of the third plenum of the CPC Central Committee in 2013. The final document of that plenum states that the market should play a “decisive role” in the allocation of resources, but at the same time confirms the “leading role” of the state in the economy. This ambiguity hinders the development and implementation of important reforms, including in the public sector, in the areas of urbanization and the fight against corruption.

The problem of Chinese debt is primarily due to the inefficiency of a number of state-owned companies. But since many large state corporations are considered “national champions,” reforms are postponed.

Urbanization is one of the main sources of growth in the Chinese economy. But Beijing does not allow people to choose where to work. The government, relying on the registration system, redirects the flow of workers to small towns and does not allow them into megacities. This reduces labor productivity.

China's anti-corruption campaign is a response to an important social problem, but it has left officials wary of making decisions, which has hampered economic activity. Perhaps the solution to the problem is to change the role of the state in commercial activities.

China has achieved impressive economic success by relying on market mechanisms. The question now is whether the new Chinese leadership will find the right balance between the “decisive” role of the market and the “guiding” but reimagined role of the state.

What can China's new leadership do to de-escalate the North Korean crisis?

James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment

No matter how attractive the idea of ​​nuclear disarmament of the DPRK may seem, in the short term this goal is hardly achievable. The priority must be to reduce the severity of this crisis and reduce the very real risk of war between North Korea and the United States. Direct contact between Washington and Pyongyang should not be expected, so it is necessary for a third party to become involved in the process. China can and should play this role.

In particular, China can offer the DPRK and the United States approximately the following: the DPRK renounces nuclear experiments in the atmosphere and missile tests over Japan and South Korea, and the United States in response refrains from training flights of its strategic bombers at a certain distance from North Korean airspace. Such an agreement would allow Pyongyang, while saving face, to abandon its threats to detonate a nuclear warhead over the Pacific Ocean or launch a missile in the direction of Guam. As an additional incentive, China could offer North Korea economic assistance, while emphasizing that sanctions will be imposed again if Pyongyang does not fulfill its obligations under the deal.

Context

Beijing is playing a serious political game

The Guardian 09/04/2017

Why were the Chinese banned from discussing Putin on social networks?

23.10.2017

Why China is investing more in Europe than in the US

23.10.2017

Face recognition system. How China is preparing to arrest people for future crimes

23.10.2017 Will Beijing's approach to the South China Sea disputes change after the congress?

Michael Swain, Senior Fellow, Asia Studies Program, Carnegie Endowment

After the congress, significant changes in China's position are unlikely. Beijing will continue to advocate for the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes through negotiations and to formulate norms of conduct for participants in such conflicts.

But this does not mean that China will not strengthen its military and diplomatic positions in the region with renewed vigor. Beijing may begin to expand its military presence on the artificial islands of the Spratly archipelago and place facilities on disputed but unoccupied reefs. China may try to increase pressure on other countries' fishing and paramilitary vessels and make diplomatic attempts to stop drilling and other activities of its opponents. A tougher response to US military activity, including freedom of navigation operations, is also likely.

Less likely but still possible steps include the creation of an air defense identification zone, as well as the establishment of straight baselines around the Spratly Islands. However, much will depend on how Beijing perceives the behavior of other parties to the conflict, including the United States. The general state of political and diplomatic relations between China and the United States and other countries in the region will also play a big role. In general, due to the lack of rules of behavior that everyone understands, the level of tension may increase.

What should President Trump expect from the convention?

Douglas Paal, Vice President for Research, Carnegie Endowment

New strategic opportunities may open up for Trump after the convention, but it will take work. Over the past few years, China has mainly tried to level out its relations with the United States. controversial issues, to prevent aggravation, but did not try to get to the root of these problems. After the Party Congress and until the National People's Congress in March 2018, there will be a reshuffling of personnel, and this will open the opportunity to take a fresh look at old contradictions.

For example, Chinese interests on the Korean Peninsula. On the one hand, Beijing is seeking stability and more decent behavior from Pyongyang, and on the other hand, it is putting pressure on Seoul in connection with the deployment of the THAAD system. As a result, there is no particular success. During his visit to Beijing, Trump must convey to Xi: it is time to think strategically, discuss how to ease tensions in the region and how to solve the problems that concern everyone.

Should Xi follow Putin's path?

Alexander Gabuev, director of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific program at the Carnegie Endowment

The closer the congress got, the more the Chinese political universe became locked in on Xi. Its role in China's political system is almost unprecedented, but there is an equivalent next door: Vladimir Putin's Russia. At the President of the Russian Federation high rating, he controls state institutions and communication systems, on the most important positions there are his protégés and allies, so that even kings could envy his power.

It is not known whether Xi views Putin, with whom he has a good personal relationship, as a role model, but their leadership styles are increasingly similar to each other. We are talking about the expansion of state control and the growing activity of the state in a variety of areas, from economics to foreign policy. And everything is presented as a struggle to return the country to greatness. Despite the shortcomings of today's Russia, the consolidation of state power under Putin has provided Russians with a previously unimaginable combination of prosperity and personal freedoms. Therefore, Xi may be attracted to the Putin model of governance, especially the idea of ​​​​the unquestionable authority of the supreme leader, rooted in the Russian (and Chinese) monarchical past.

Over the next five years, however, Xi will need to avoid the shortcomings of the Putin regime that have set Russia on a path to long-term stagnation. A long stay in power helps to consolidate resources, but when it lasts too long, the system becomes fragile and loses its ability to survive without its key figure. Moreover, the obsession with stability, another negative feature of the Putin regime, may prevent many needed reforms.

What does Xi's consolidation of power mean for Europe?

François Godeman, Senior Fellow, Asia Studies Program, Carnegie Endowment

The consolidation of Xi’s power was noticeable back in the first half of 2013, and even then it could be assumed that the idea of ​​collective leadership in China was losing popularity. It's amazing how these assumptions come true. The opposite predictions, that strong personal power will give rise to strong opposition, did not come true.

The clear hierarchy of Chinese power has a positive effect on relations with external partners. Xi is the first Chinese leader to visit EU structures. He personally promoted two projects in Europe: One Belt, One Road, which ends in Europe, and a trade agreement with the EU, which will help overcome obstacles in economic relations. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Xi spoke out for a multipolar world order and the rule of law, which was a balm for the soul of Europeans.

But the discrepancies between these words and Beijing's actual policies are becoming increasingly obvious. On the eve of the latest EU-China summit, it became clear that there was no talk of compromise on trade issues yet. The Belt and Road Initiative mainly concerns a group of new eastern states The EU cooperating with China in the 16+1 format, rather than the European Union as a whole. China is increasingly promoting its own understanding of the international order, and the European Union has no choice but to perceive it as a rising world power and hope for favorable changes in Beijing’s policies.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Illustration copyright Getty Images Image caption At the congress, Xi Jinping announced his scenario for China's development for the next 20 years

The next 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China ended in Beijing.

The Congress of People's Representatives meets every five years and is to some extent a routine event, since the key decisions announced at it are usually made in advance and do not become news either to the party leadership or to analysts.

But there are also exceptions. On the eve of the 19th Congress, there was a lot of talk about the growing concentration of power in the hands of the current President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, who took the helm at the last congress five years ago. It was assumed that his old comrade Wang Qishan, the head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and in fact the internal security forces, would replace Li Keqiang as Premier of the State Council of the PRC, but this did not happen.

But what happened at the congress is much more interesting. For example, "Xi Jinping Thought" was included in the CPC charter. In fact, the congress itself began with a three-hour speech by Xi, where he presented his philosophy entitled “Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on Chinese-Style Socialism in a New Era.” Before him, only Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping appeared in the text of the document. True, Jiang Zemin’s “theory of three representations” is also mentioned, but not a single Chinese leader, except Mao Zedong, described his philosophy as “thoughts.”

Now any attempt to challenge the decisions of Chairman Xi automatically conflicts with the charter of the CPC - in China such a situation cannot be called winning.

Who is more valuable than mother history?

This has not happened in the Celestial Empire since the days of Mao. Coupled with the increasingly active praise of Xi Jinping’s work in all areas of life, the inclusion of his “thoughts” in the founding party documents brings to mind a new “Chairman Mao” and little red books with his sayings in every Chinese pocket.

Illustration copyright Reuters Image caption There is still no point in comparing Xi and Mao directly.

The works of Xi Jinping are already being replicated in China. If you don't want a pocket quote book, you can download a collection of quotes to your mobile phone.

But, as Vasily Kashin, a senior researcher at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, notes, there are also differences from the Mao regime: “Xi still faces significant resistance at the level of regional leaders. Not all decisions made at the center at his insistence are brought to execution locally,” he says. A typical example There are difficulties in implementing decisions to eliminate excess capacity in a number of industries financed from local budgets - they are not implemented systematically. Mao Zedong had no problems with this after the Cultural Revolution.”

“Only in order to emphasize the ambitious nature of Xi Jinping’s personality and the authority that he has already gained, one can compare him with Mao,” agrees Andrei Karneev, deputy director of the Institute of Asian and African Studies. “But these are completely different eras, different people. And no one in China, including the entire top of the CCP, dreams of returning to the past."

Still, one should not expect a repeat of the events of 1966-76 in full, Kashin believes. If only because almost all of the current political leadership, including Xi Jinping himself, came from families of those repressed during the Cultural Revolution. However, the purge of the party and bureaucratic apparatus is underway in full swing.

In the five years since the beginning of Xi’s rule, 1 million 300 thousand people have passed through the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, recalls Vasily Kashin. Although most of them got off with penalties along party lines - reprimands, transfers to other jobs, dismissals - 10-15 percent of those involved in these cases went to prison. The fight against corruption, which Xi Jinping championed during his first term, is in full swing, solving both practical problems and the goals of further consolidating power.

"Teacher Xi said"

Actually, Xi Jinping’s thoughts themselves are not new, especially the first one - “ensuring the leading role of the CPC in all areas of activity.” The second thought emphasizes that all transformations are carried out for the sake of the people, and the third is the inevitability and necessity of reforms.

Illustration copyright Getty Images Image caption Contrary to expectations, the Standing Committee of the CPC Politburo did not include people considered possible successors to Xi

Quite a lot of reforms are coming. The congress approved a plan for the long-term development of China until 2050, the further enrichment of the country and its population and an increasingly active presence on the world stage. The “fat” 2000s with double-digit economic growth rates are a thing of the past, and noticeable distortions in the country’s economy now have to be corrected.

“On the one hand, the old state apparatus, formed over 30 years of reform policies, offers passive resistance to Xi’s policies, on the other, the formation of this layer was associated with systemic corruption, which often took on more savage forms than anything seen in Russia,” says Vasily Kashin. “It has reached such a level that there is a threat of losing control over important policy areas.”

Breaking the resistance of the bureaucracy is an important task for Xi Jinping, but it is not mentioned in the Thoughts. But what is mentioned is “consistent approval of the legislative framework and principles of the rule of law.”

In the speech of the chairman, several more thoughts were voiced, in particular, about the harmonization of human relations with environment and maintaining unchanged the concept of “one country, two systems”. These theses are also intended for foreign listeners - Western investors and entrepreneurs. Xi also came up with the idea of ​​a “community of common destiny,” for the formation of which he proposes to intensify global processes.

However, the Chinese leader already spoke with this idea at the economic forum in Davos, and one of the central projects of Xi’s first term - “One Belt - One Road” - seems to be directly related to the concept of “community”. However, there is no talk yet about trade compromises between China and Europe, not to mention America.

“Community of Shared Destiny” is a relatively new term in the Chinese political lexicon, which demonstrates China’s claims to an active role in world affairs, says Andrei Karneev. During the time of Deng Xiaoping, China carefully refrained from participating in solving world problems, including those that directly affected it. Since then, the position and role of the Celestial Empire in the world have changed radically, and Beijing insists that its voice in solving problems affecting all of humanity is clearly articulated and well heard.

As for the rule of law, which Xi Jinping also thought about, this is not a new thesis. All Chinese leaders, starting with Deng Xiaoping, have talked about him. And the idea of ​​the unity of law for everyone in general was set forth in the works of Chinese “legalists”-legalists in ancient times, in particular, in the “Book of the Ruler of the Shan Region,” written, according to legend, in the 4th century BC.

Illustration copyright Getty Images Image caption What outweighs - the letter of the law or party policy?

However, speaking about the slogan “We are building a rule-of-law state,” we must remember that in China this thesis is not understood quite as an outside observer might think, recalls Andrei Karneev. The rule of law is limited by the dominant role of the CCP. This contradiction can be overcome with the help of a truly independent judicial system, but the idea of ​​separation of powers in the Chinese elite is categorically rejected.

The multipolar world and the rule of law, which Xi Jinping spoke so much about in Davos, were, of course, received more than favorably in Europe, but how exactly the Celestial Empire will participate in putting these principles into practice is still unclear.

"Managing many is the same as managing few. It's a matter of organization."

But it is clear exactly how Beijing will defend its gains in the field of building “socialism with Chinese characteristics in new era"Among Xi Jinping's Thoughts there is also a provision on maximizing the party's role in the construction and functioning of the army. He began army reforms almost immediately after taking office.

Xi Jinping began a decisive fight against corruption in the highest circles of generals almost immediately after taking office. Over the past five years, the officer corps has been radically renewed, and the model of the army, according to military analysts, is moving away from the Russian one, which exists as a state within a state, to the Western one, which involves joint leadership and a more consistent integration of army structures into the state.

Illustration copyright Getty Images Image caption 9 out of 10 congress delegates from the army attended for the first time

The renewal in the ranks of the PLA command is clearly visible at the congress: out of 300 delegates from the army, only 30 took part in the previous congress five years ago.

At the 19th Congress, a resolution was adopted that set the task of modernizing the country's armed forces to the level of the leading countries of the world. Again, nothing fundamentally new has happened. The deadlines named in the military section of Xi Jinping's report have existed before: completing mechanization and information and increasing the strategic capabilities of the army by 2020, and the strongest armed forces in the world by 2050. Now a new one has been added to them: by 2035, the technical modernization of the army must be completed.

“China will pursue a great power policy - this is a term that began to be used in the previous five years of Xi Jinping’s reign,” explains Vasily Kashin. “It is partly due to the fact that China has created a colossal a business empire with accumulated investments of more than a trillion dollars. The mission of protecting China's overseas interests appears increasingly explicitly in the latest white paper on military strategy."

“The rhetoric about a strong army is certainly related to the concerns of the CPC leadership regarding, firstly, internal stability, and secondly, China’s relations with the United States and its neighbors,” says Andrei Karneev. “The rapidly growing role of China in world affairs objectively requires modernization of the armed forces, bringing them into line with modern requirements."

However, experts urge not to panic too much about China’s military ambitions. Yes, China's military budget is large (according to official data last year - $146 billion, which makes it second in the world after the United States), and the army is receiving more and more modern systems weapons. But from the point of view of the real combat effectiveness of the army, its organizational structure and the effectiveness of using problems there are still many, and corruption is not the only one of them.

Xi Jinping forever?

The question of who will replace Xi Jinping in five years remains unanswered. Andrei Karneev considers this the main result of the congress.

Illustration copyright Getty Images Image caption There is no shortage of outdoor propaganda in portraits of the President of the People's Republic of China

Many analysts believe that China is gradually moving away from the principle of collective leadership and rotation of supreme power. Perhaps Xi decided to do this, looking at the more than modest achievements of the country during the reign of Hu Jintao, or perhaps he wants to leave himself more time to complete the large-scale reforms begun in the first years of his rule.

“This is an important congress that ends a certain historical period. The Chinese emphasized this when they announced “socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era,” says Vasily Kashin. Before this, the main task was first to feed the country, then to clothe and shoe it, then achieve an acceptable level of well-being. China's rapid economic growth in the last decade has largely solved these problems, and now we can move on to larger-scale tasks related, among other things, to China's new role in the world - it is no longer a “global factory” Deng. Xiaoping, who actually leased the country with countless labor resources to Western manufacturers.

Xi Jinping seems to understand that China’s growth in prosperity and economic power is not due to the Soviet-style planned economy - and demonstrates himself to be perhaps a greater supporter of the free economy than, for example, Donald Trump, not to mention the states of Western Europe.

However, in the field of political control mechanisms, Xi defends the CCP’s system of comprehensive control over all socio-political processes in the Middle Kingdom. Moreover, he calls on party members to return to the "original values" that were once the driving force of the CCP, but market reforms and the relative prosperity that followed have caused many Chinese communists to forget about them.

Andrei Karneev believes that Xi is a leader who, in a moment of crisis, is trying to preserve at least those remnants of legitimacy that the CPC has in the eyes of the population. True, for this he chose mainly methods of a prohibitive nature. IN global world, whose supporter is the President of the People's Republic of China, these measures are unlikely to bring the desired result.